Pakistan: An Opportunity Submerged
At this very moment, 1/5 of Pakistan is underwater (Figure 1. Over 20 million people have been affected with a climbing death toll of 1,492 (1). If actions are not quickly taken to mitigate the consequences of this disaster, the death toll can be expected to climb with the onset of threatening disease vectors. When Haiti was rocked by a 7.0 earthquake, the world witnessed an outpouring of aid from around the world, most significantly the United States. Yet has information creeps out of Pakistan, the response has been dismal.
In the last few years, Pakistan has become central within the war on terrorism. Although the majority of threats are located along the federal administered tribal areas . While these tribal areas are located along the border of Afghanistan and are not directly affected by the flooding (Figure 2), there is nonetheless an importance to assisting the populations at risk so as to promote strengthened relationships within civil society and ultimately negate many of the conditions that form a foundation for extremism and extremist sympathies.
While the United Nations has called for 460 Million dollars in necessary aid for the region, thus far only 1/2 of this funding has been met. Although USAID directs 1.5 billion to Pakistan per year, and has additionally promoted over 100 million to this new disaster, it is quite unlikely that many of the Pakistani people are unable to see the connection between aid assistance obtained and the efforts of the American government. With this gap in mind, how may it be overcome and how can humanitarian efforts create new opportunities for development and stabilization?
Based on the CIA World Factbook, already maintains high rates of disease risk for diarrhea, hepatitis, typhoid, dengue fever, and malaria. 24% of the population lives below the poverty line with only 36% living within urban areas. Arguably, the majority of people affected by the flooding do not have access to goods and services on a regular basis, although the country contains 259,197 km of roadways, ranking it number 20 in the world.
While a UN report designates a variety of sectors that require attention, such as shelter, food, and nutrition, communication, and health care all require dramatic attention. Yet it also states that accessing the populations most in need may be the greatest limitation in the aid distribution process.
So perhaps the greatest opportunity here is for the American government to directly participate in the development of a transportation infrastructure within Pakistan. One that will support the distribution of aid, but will also support the transit of agricultural goods to markets, that will interconnect the remote regions of the country, and will facilitate the delivery of manufactured goods beyond the cities. Of course it might stimulate more rural-to-urban migration in the short term, but it will just as likely facilitate a broad regional economic stability. Likewise, the development of roads, bridges, and railroads provides a means for water and sanitation improvements as well. Culverts, sewage systems, and runoff management systems may all be implemented within the road construction process, laying a foundation for vector control and mitigating the impact of future monsoon threats.
In coordination with UN cluster efforts, with a focus on advancing education opportunities (as Pakistan ranks number 155 in the world for), education), the development of an enhanced and sanitary transit system may be the key to improving the well being of the Pakistani people and undermining the potential threats of extremism in the long run.
Three Cups for Afghanistan
For a couple years now I have been told by friends, colleauges, and Oprah to read Three Cups of Tea. All this time I put it off, not for any particular reason, but simply put it on the list of things to do later. Recently however I read that the US military policy in Afghanistan has been greatly affected by the teachings of this book, as top leadership has turned to its pages and author, Greg Mortenson, for guidance. It was also later announced by Gen. Patraeus that soldiers need to “fight corruption” and take the time to “drink lots of tea” to win over the Afghan people, a clear and obvious reference. So I decided it was time to finally read the book.
I’m nearly finished with it, but already the distinction between Mortenson and the concept of “drink lots of tea” has become glaringly obvious. Military leadership is correct to assert that stabilization and partnership demands the consistent and dedicated study of the human terrain. That successes will develop from the bottom up by intersecting the capacity of the population with the means of the United States. Yet what seems most important, is that Mortenson never set out to win people over, he never studied cultures, languages, histories, and the local values purely to accomplish his own objectives. In contrast, he learned to speak Urdu, the practice of Islam, and the local histories of northern Pakistan because these things held deep and profound meaning to him. He was not simply drinking tea, but was internalizing the experience of the people around him. Mortenson’s work to build schools for impoverished populations was about opening his own heart and mind to change as much as it was about contributing to the needs of the Pakistani people.
And so the question must arise, do US soldiers have the desire and capability to internalize the lives of the Afghani people? Perhaps. The work of the Human Terrain Teams has been critical to mitigating conflict and negating future causalities. Yet how much of this responsibility can be thrust upon the common foot soldier? I suspect that if any Americans within Afghanistan have the most ability to shoulder the responsibility, it consist of those working in PRT teams throughout the country. Unfortunately the ongoing complication arises to promote development within insecure territories, yet there is another lesson to be found within Three Cups of Tea.
A great part of Mortenson’s success was determined by the manner in which he expanded his projects. He did not go to a foreign region and simply ask “would you like a school?” In fact, the one time he did, it was a disaster. Instead he completed a series of successes with one local population, which led to the trust and inspiration of neighboring tribes. Expanding in a piece meal fashion, he let each success inspire the next one until he had a streamlined, low cost, and highly efficient methodology in place. This methodology was not implemented from the outset, but developed from the landscape and in coordination with the people, consistent with their needs and their voice. I suspect this may be the most important element within the book, and likely the most important lesson to apply for all those working within conflict zones throughout the world. Of course it sounds far simpler than reality ever entails, but if military policy is to be affected by the lessons of this novel and Mortenson’s life experience, and it may be the most imperative.
Confronting Terrorism: Restructuring Somalia’s Primary Export
As the actions of Al Shabaab extended beyond the Somali border and into Kampala just a few days ago, leaving over 70 dead from the bombings, I’ve been thinking a great deal about the role of the AMISOM forces and the prospects for stabilizing this broken nation. Are the actions taken by UNISOM sufficient to achieve peace and security within Somalia? What more needs to be done, and more importantly, what actions can be taken based upon the available resources?
Looking back over the African Union’s AMISOM newsletter, The AMISOM Bulletin, I only find evidence that UNISOM forces have pursued merely a conventional and unidimensional approach toward counterinsurgency. The only evidence to the contrary is a statement from the AMISOM Force Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha, “ There is no military solution to this conflict; only a political solution, that is, dialogue and negotiations can achieve a lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia. Somalis must sit around a table and resolve their differences. The solution will not come from without; it will only come from Somalis themselves.” However this is only indicates a recognition of the political forces within the stabilization and reconstruction process, it does not make any reference to the sociocultural, economic, environmental, and global elements that are necessary to end the violence and benefit the lives of the inhabitants. It is obvious that AMISOM is ill equipped to meet facilitate all of these concerns, yet as the country remains bound by violence, it is difficult for NGO’s to fill in the gaps.
Counterinsurgency is a complex process that requires more than just military action. It requires building relationships and most importantly, the ability to provide the local populations with something they consider valuable. It requires constructing metrics to determine progress, the development and implementation of a popular narrative for mobilization, and to have a keen understanding of the enemy that goes far beyond intelligence passed down from upper command.
Within Somalia, it is important for counterinsurgent forces to recognize the founding factors of radicalism, terrorism, and militancy. Terrorism is not merely the product of social processes and economic devastation, but can be understood as an economic commodity. The socio-economic infrastructure is oriented around a culture of violence as much as it is concerned with other basic commodities such as food or shelter because in contemporary Somalia, survival requires an understanding of violence and its social underpinnings. As a lone individual, or as a part of a family or community, to survive and have insurance of future survival (security) is to either partake in the socio-economic processes that facilitate conflict or to avoid them. Either way, each course of action requires the same understanding of these processes.
Sadly, as Somalia has been left to indulge in its own suffering and deterioration by the international community for so long, the internal economic structure has consolidated so that its exports can reflect nothing else. As there is no longer a sufficient livelihood in animal husbandry or agriculture, yet no infrastructure for technical development to partake in the global marketplace, one of the best options is to either partake in piracy or militancy. While the Somali people must necessarily seek greater unity and peace, without the sufficient infrastructure to carry out those goals, they lack a means to implement this vision in a durable fashion. In the end, the only way to negate the exportation of terrorism is to work toward a Somalia based on something more durable, less violent, and more integrated within the global marketplace.
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